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SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After
Sarbanes-Oxley
By jayne W Barnard*

Corporate misdeeds will be found and will be punished .... The SEC will
now have the administrative authority to bar dishonest directors and officers
from ever again serving in positions of corporate responsibility.... Corporate
crime will no longer pay.
President George W Bush 1
Beginning in the spring of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") set out to acquire the power to suspend or bar individuals from
serving as an officer or director of a public company. The Commission had long
enjoyed the administrative power to suspend or bar brokers, investment advisers,
and investment company managers. 2 Since 1990, it had also had the power to
seek a court order suspending or barring securities law violators from serving as
a public company officer or director. 3
In the Commission's view, several changes in the existing regime seemed necessary. First, the Commission wanted to modify the standard applied by federal
courts when considering requests for suspension or bar orders. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it wanted to eliminate the need to go to court in order to
secure a suspension or bar order against securities law violators.
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act" or "Sarbanes-Oxley") in
july 2002, 4 the Commission has apparently seen its dreams (on this issue) come
true. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act now provides that, in order for a federal district
court to enter a suspension or bar order, it need only find that the defendant
before it is "unfit." 5 This standard is a change from the prior formulation, which

*james Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. Thanks to Ted Cundick,
William and Mary Class of 2004, for his outstanding research assistance on this and other projects.
Thanks also to Mechele Dickerson, Lisa Nicholson, Doug Branson, Neal Devins, and john Tucker for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
l. Press Release, Remarks by the President at Signing of H.R. 3763, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-l.html (last visited
Dec. 29, 2003).
2. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
5. /d. § 305, 116 Stat. at 778.
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required a finding of "substantial unfitness."6 Despite its ambiguity, the change in
language was clearly intended to reduce the burden of proof required of the
Commission.7
The Act also provides that the SEC may now enter a suspension or bar order
on its own in a cease-and-desist proceeding, rather than having to go to court.
The applicable standard is the same as the standard now employed by the federal
courts-"unfitness. "8
The impact of these two new provisions is obvious. First, the Commission will
no longer have to go to federal court in order to secure a suspension or bar order.
Instead, it will seek most of these orders in the less demanding context of ceaseand-desist proceedings. 9 Second, the Commission is likely to argue that the task
of proving "unfitness" is significantly less demanding than the task of proving
"substantial unfitness." Third, by utilizing the cease-and-desist proceeding rather
than going to court to seek a suspension or bar order, the Commission will argue
that it is no longer required to show a "reasonable likelihood" of future misconduct
(as has been required by the courts to support such an order), but need only to
demonstrate "some risk" of future misconduct. This standard, or at least some
version of it, is the standard the Commission now employs (and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has endorsed) in cease-and-desist proceedings. 10
In this Article, I will briefly review the history of the Commission's suspension
and bar powers prior to enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 11 I will then briefly
examine both the character of cease-and-desist proceedings prior to SarbanesOxley, and the law that governs those proceedings, especially recent case law
defining the standard for entering a cease-and-desist order. 12 I will then trace the
evolution of those portions of Sarbanes-Oxley which changed the standard for
entry of a suspension or bar order from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness," and
discuss what this change might mean in practice. 13 Finally, I will explore the
strengths and weaknesses of the new statutory regime. 14
6. See 15 U.S. C.§ 77t(e) (2000) (Securities Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000) (Exchange Act).
7. See infra the section entitled "Gaps in the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislative History."
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act§ 1105, 116 Stat. at 809-10.
9. This is especially true if the Commission succeeds in getting statutory authority to obtain civil
money penalties from officers and directors in cease-and-desist proceedings. See H.R. 2179, theSecurities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, which would provide the necessary
authority. The Security Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th
Cong. (2003). The Commission is vigorously supponing this bill. See Testimony Concerning the
Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act, Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of
Enforcement, SEC (June 5, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/060503tssmc.htm.
10. See infra the section entitled "The Evolution of the 'Some Risk' Standard in Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings."
11. See infra the section entitled "A Brief History of the SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers." For a
fuller treatment of this history, see jayne W Barnard, The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective,
76 TULANE L. REv. 1253 (2002); jayne W Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of
1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 32 (1989); jayne
W Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489 (1992).
12. See infra the section entitled 'The Rise and Use of Cease-and-Desist Proceedings."
13. See infra the sections entitled "The Origins and Unfolding of the Sarbanes-Oxley Suspension
and Bar Provisions" and "Gaps in the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislative History."
14. See infra the section entitled "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the New Regime."
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The most obvious strengths of the new legislation are (i) its efficiency; (ii) its
symbolic value (in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress has endorsed the Commission's view that it should have new and powerful tools to hold executives
accountable when they fail in their fiduciary duties) ; and (iii) the fact that the
Commission is now in parity with other federal agencies, specifically federal banking regulators, in its ability to administratively suspend and bar individuals who
flagrantly violate its rules.
There are several problems with the new legislation, however, which are compounded by the meager legislative history that accompanies the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. These problems include: (i) neither the statute nor its legislative history provides any useful parameters by which courts or the Commission may evaluate the
critical issue of "unfitness"; (ii) both the statute and its legislative history fail to
distinguish between conduct that may warrant a finite-term suspension from serving as a public company officer or director and the more egregious types of
conduct that may warrant a lifetime bar; (iii) both the statute and its legislative
history fail to resolve the issue of most concern to the Commission-whether and
in what ways the Commission will have to demonstrate a likelihood of recurring
misconduct before a court will enter a suspension or bar order or before entering
its own suspension or bar order in a cease-and-desist proceeding; and (iv) the
statute fails to provide for a "safety valve" by which debarred persons, after a
reasonable period of time, might have a meaningful chance to resume the right
to seek executive-level work commensurate with their skills.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEC's SUSPENSION AND BAR POWERS
THE INJUNCTIONS-ONLy ERA

From 1934, when the SEC was created, until 1990, when the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (the "Remedies Act") 15 was
passed, the primary tool available to the SEC Enforcement Division was the injunction.16 The injunction is, in fact, many different tools, because it encompasses
such orders as disgorgement of profits, 17 orders to discontinue specific violations
of the law, 18 orders imposing a receivership on misbehaving corporations, 19 and
15. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429,
104 Stat. 931 (1990).
16. See Daniel]. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions , 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001).
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 E2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988);
SEC v. Blatt, 583 E2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); see also SEC v. Blavin, 760 E2d 706, 713 (6th Cir.
1984); SEC v. Materia, 745 E2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); SEC v.
Commonwealth Chern. Sec., Inc., 574 E2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978).
18. See Barnard , The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, supra note 11 , at 1257
nn.17-18 .
19. See, e.g., SEC v. KS Res., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5891 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1997) (affirming district
court's appointment of a permanent receiver); SEC v. Am. Bd . of Trade, Inc. 830 E2d 431 , 438 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938 (1988); SEC v. First Fin. Group of Tex., 645 E2d 429, 436-37
(5th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp. , 625 F. Supp. 890 (D. Nev. 1986); SEC v. R. J. Allen &
Assocs., 386 E Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974); see also SEC v. Health Main. Centers, Inc, Litigation Release
No. 17664, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2043 (WD. Wash. Aug. 7, 2002).
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other ancillary orders such as those requiring the appointment of a compliance
officer or new board-level committee. 20 The most encompassing type of injunction
is the "obey-the-law" injunction, which prohibits the defendant from violating any
provision of the federal securities laws. 21
Prior to enactment of the Remedies Act, the Commission believed that its power
to seek an injunction also included the power to seek an order suspending or
barring a defendant from serving as an officer or director of the company within
which the securities violation had occurred; in effect, this was a court-ordered
removal from office. 22 The Commission also believed that the power to seek an
injunction included the power to seek an order suspending or barring a defendant
from serving as an officer or director of any public company. Certainly, the Commission often included such a request in its complaints. It appears, however, that,
prior to passage of the Remedies Act in 1990, only one such order was ever
actually entered by a federal district court. 23 Nevertheless, these types of orders
were routinely included in dozens of pre-Remedies Act settlements. 24 Ultimately,
in a case involving the colorful Victor Posner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit confirmed that the Commission did, in fact, have the authority to
seek a suspension and bar order as an ancillary remedy, even in the absence of
express statutory authority. 25
THE REMEDIES ACT PROVIDES EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO SEEK
SUSPENSION AND BAR ORDERS IN COURT

Beginning in 1987, under the direction of Chairman David S. Ruder, and continuing into the George H. W Bush administration, under the direction of Chairman Richard C. Breeden, the Commission pursued four key legislat~ve initiatives:
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Xerox Corp., Litigation Release No. 17465, 2002 SEC LEXIS 896, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. ll, 2002) (requiring the issuer to appoint a committee of outside directors to review
the company's internal accounting controls and policies); SEC v. Cannon Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. ll603, 39 S.E.C. Docket 330 (Nov. 9, 1987) (requiring the issuer to hire a consultant to
review new policies and procedures for a three-year period); SEC v. Mattei, Inc., Litigation Release
No. 6531,5 S.E.C. Docket 240,1974 SEC LEXIS 2566, at *1 (Oct. 2, 1974) (requiring the issuer to
appoint two additional unaffiliated directors and to establish a Financial Controls and Audit Committee
and a Litigation and Claims Committee).
21. See Barnard, The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, supra note ll, at 1257 n.19
and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Am. Beef Packers, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 96,079, at 91,877 (D. Neb. May 4, 1977) (enjoining the defendant from assuming any position as
officer or director of American Beef Packers, Inc., except upon a showing that procedures have been
instituted to prevent a recurrence of violations of the securities laws).
23. See SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)~ 94,501,
at 95,759 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974) (ordering that defendant White is "hereby prohibited from assuming a position as or continuing to act as either an officer or director of any public company
except upon a showing to the Court that measures have been taken to prevent repetition of the
conduct alleged .... ").
24. See jayne W Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, supra note ll, at
54-55 n.158 (listing settled cases); Jayne W Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit
to Serve"?, supra note ll, at 1509 n.101 (same).
25. SEC v. Posner, 16 F3d 520, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the entry of a lifetime bar order),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1077 (1995).
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(i) a proposal by which the Commission would receive express authority to seek
civil penalties in litigated proceedings; (ii) a proposal by which the Commission
would receive authority to conduct its own administrative proceedings, known
as cease-and-desist proceedings, against unregulated securities laws violators as
well as regulated professionals; (iii) a proposal to expressly authorize federal district courts to enter suspension and bar orders in litigated proceedings; and
(iv) a proposal by which the Commission would, itself, be authorized to enter
suspension or bar orders in cease-and-desist proceedings.
The first proposal, civil penalties, bore fruit when the Remedies Act was passed
in 1990. 26 The Remedies Act authorized the Commission to seek, and district
courts to impose, monetary penalties for violations of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act, and the Investment Advisers Act. 27 The
second proposal, cease-and-desist powers, also bore fruit through the Remedies
Act. The Act provided that the Commission may order a person who "is violating,
has violated, or is about to violate any provision of [the federal securities laws],"
to cease-and-desist from committing the violation. 28 The Commission may also
enter a cease-and-desist order against any person that "is, was, or would be a
cause of [a securities law] violation." 29 The third proposal, express suspension and
bar authority for the federal district courts, also was successful, though not in the
way the Commission had initially hoped. 30 The Remedies Act expressly authorized
the district courts to enter a suspension or bar order only in cases involving
scienter-based violations. 31 The standard for determining whether a suspension
or bar order was appropriate was whether the defendant's conduct reflected "substantial unfitness to serve." 32
Only the fourth proposal failed. Congress denied the Commission the authority
to enter suspension or bar orders administratively as part of its cease-and-desist
powers. Critics had warned that granting such authority would confer on the
26. See Ralph C. Ferrara eta!., Hardball! The SEC's New Arsenal of Enforcement Weapons, 47 Bus.
LAw. 33 (1991) (detailing the legislative history of the Remedies Act).
27. See Securities Act § 20(d), 15 U.S. C. § 77t(d) (2000); Exchange Act § 2l(d)(3), 15 U.S. C.
§ 78u(d)(3)(2000); Investment Company Act§ 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (2000); Investment Advisers Act§ 209(e), 15 U.S. C. § 80b-9(e) (2000).
28. See Securities Act§ 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a); Exchange Act§ 21C(a), 15 U.S. C.§ 78u-3(a);
Investment Company Act§ 9([)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(f)(1); Investment Advisers Act§ 203(k)(l), 15
u.s. c. § 80b-3(k)(l).
29. See Securities Act§ 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a); Exchange Act§ 21C(a), 15 U.S. C.§ 78u-3(a);
Investment Company Act§ 9(£)(1), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-9(f)(1); Investment Advisers Act§ 203(k)(l), 15
U.S. C. § 80b-3(k)(1). The Commission is also authorized to order the -respondent to comply, or to
take steps to effect compliance, with the relevant securities statute upon such terms and conditions
and within such time as the Commission may specify.
30. For example, the Commission's initial proposal would have permitted the entry of a suspension
or bar order for any securities law violation, including negligent violations, and provided no standard
by which a determination could be made. See Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of
1989, supra note 11, at 33.
31. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements,
47 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1104 (1992) (noting that "Congress intended corporate bars for use against
'deliberate fraudulent conduct,' and suggested that the remedy may be appropriate [only] against
recidivists or in cases where the violation was 'particularly egregious'").
32. Securities Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 77t(e); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2).
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Commission "unwarranted power and would distort its proper role in maintaining
the integrity of the capital markets. "33
THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL
UNFITNESS" STANDARD

Following enactment of the Remedies Act, federal district courts soon began
construing "substantial unfitness" by reference to the so-called "six-factor" test,
which called for consideration of the following six factors: "(l) the 'egregiousness'
of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's 'repeat offender'
status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the
defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation;
and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur." 34 The six-factor test was later
refined by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Pate/.3 5 The Patel court recognized the sixfactor test as "useful in making the unfitness assessment," 36 but went on to caution:
[W]e do not mean to say that [the six factors] are the only factors that may
be taken into account or even that it is necessary to apply all these factors
in every case. A district court should be afforded substantial discretion in
deciding whether to impose a bar to employment in a public company. 37
Relying on the six-factor test or some variant of it, courts from 1990 until 2002
issued only two published opinions denying outright the Commission's requests
for a suspension or bar order. 38 With these two exceptions, however, the Commission was consistently successful throughout the 1990s whenever it sought a
suspension or bar order. In two cases, the court declined to enter a lifetime bar
order, but instead entered six-year and ten-year suspension orders, respectively,
applicable across all industries. 39 In another case, the court declined to enter an
order applicable across all industries, but rather entered a lifetime bar order precluding the defendant from serving as an officer or director of any banking or
financial institution. 40 In still another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
33. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, supra note 11, at 34.
34. SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 98,374, at 90,592 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
35. 61 E3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
36. Id. at 141.
37. Id.
38. See SEC v. Pace, 173 E Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that the defendant could be
enjoined from engaging in the type of conduct proven in this case but that the Commission had failed
to establish that he should be barred); SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
~ 98,374, at 90,592 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that where the defendant, a first offender, had already
been disciplined in parallel proceedings and permanently barred from doing business with the FDA,
the Commission had not demonstrated a need for either a permanent bar or suspension order).
39. SEC v. McCaskey, [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 91,533, at 97,404 (S.D. N.Y. 2001)
(entering a six-year suspension order); SEC v. Murphy, litigation Release No. 17538, 2002 SEC LEXIS
1388 (May 30, 2002) (reponing that the U.S. District Coun for the District of Massachusetts had
entered a ten-year suspension order).
40. SEC v. Farrell, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 99,365, at 96,305 (WD.N.Y.
1996).
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Second Circuit cautioned against knee-jerk resort to a lifetime bar order when a
finite suspension or an industry-specific order might protect the interests of investors just as wellY In essence, the court in SEC v. Patel created a hierarchy of
options, in which lesser sanctions were to be considered and rejected before a
court could enter the more draconian sanction of a lifetime bar.
[B]efore imposing a permanent bar, the court should consider whether a
conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular industry) and/or a bar
limited in time (e.g., a bar of five years) might be sufficient, especially where
there is no prior history of unfitness ... . If the district court decides that a
conditional ban or a ban limited in time is not warranted, it should give
reasons why a lifetime injunction is imposedY
The case was remanded and later settled when the defendant voluntarily accepted
the imposition of a lifetime bar.43
With the exception of these few cases, however, and the rare case in which the
Commission withdrew its request for a suspension or bar order, 44 the Commission
regularly succeeded under the Remedies Act in persuading the courts to enter a
lifetime bar order. 45 It was also successful in securing lifetime bar orders in scores
of settled cases. 46
41. SEC v. Patel, 61 E3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995).
42. /d .
43. E-mail from Michael J. Resko (Patel's defense counsel) to jayne W Barnard, Professor of Law,
The College of William and Mary (April 4, 2002) (on file with The Business Lawyer).
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Antar, 15 E Supp. 2d 477, 533 n.33 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that the Commission
had apparently decided not to press the suspension or bar issue).
45. See, e.g , SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 E3d 1186, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Zubkis, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.~ 90,769,
at 93, 745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2000) (entering a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Chester Holdings Ltd., 41
E Supp. 2d 505, 531 (D.N.j. 1999) (entering a lifetime bar order against defendant joseph Pignatiello);
SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 E Supp. 846, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (entering a lifetime bar order), aff'd,
159 E3d 1348 (2d Cir. 1998); see also SEC v. Tanner, Litigation Release No. 17790, 2002 SEC LEXIS
2631, at *2 (Oct. 17, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York had entered a lifetime bar order against defendants Tanner and Evans); SEC v. johnson, Litigation
Release No. 17717, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2314, at *3 (Sept. 10, 2002) (noting that, in 1996, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas had entered a lifetime bar order against defendant
johnson); SEC v. Scorpion Techs., Inc., Litigation Release No. 17634, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1914, at *1
(July 29, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York had
entered a lifetime bar order against defendant Brown); SEC v. Hollywood Trenz, Inc., Litigation Release
No. 17539, 2002 SEC LEX1S 1421, at *2 (May 30, 2002) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia had entered a lifetime bar order against defendant Showalter); SEC v. Leung,
Litigation Release No. 17458, 2002 SEC LEXIS 840, at *1 (Apr. 4, 2002) (reporting that the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia had entered a lifetime bar order against defendants Miko
and Leung); In re Silver, Litigation Release No.15437, 1997 SEC LEXIS 1630, at *3 (Aug. 11, 1997)
(reporting that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California had entered a lifetime bar
order against defendant Silver); SEC v. Monus, Litigation Release No. 14 716, 1995 SEC LEXIS 3095,
at *1 (Nov. 9, 1995) (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the District of Ohio had entered a
lifetime bar order against defendant Monus).
46. See, e.g., SEC v. Matus, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14225, at *7 (E. D. Tex. june 21, 2002) (entering
by consent a permanent injunction, including a provision barring the defendant from acting as a
director or officer of any public company); see also SEC v. Eagle Bldg. Techs., Inc., Litigation Release
No. 17803, 2002 WL 31386094, at *1 (Oct. 23, 2002) (reporting that defendant Damato had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Christensen, Litigation Release No. 17787, 78
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It is thus curious that in February 2002, Stephen M. Cutler, Director of the
Division of Enforcement, complained that the federal courts were imposing an
S.E.C. Docket 2261 (Oct. 16, 2002) (reponing that defendant Uselton had consented to the entry of
a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Kopper, Litigation Release No. 17692, 78 S.E.C. Docket 1090 (Aug. 21,
2002) (reporting that defendant Kopper had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v.
Tishman, Litigation Release No.17617, 2002 Wl 1558815, at *1 (july 16, 2002) (reponing that
defendant Tishman had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Mortell, Litigation
Release No.17542, 77 S.E.C. Docket 2679 (june 5, 2002) (reponing that defendant Monell had
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Paloma, Litigation Release No.17462, 2002 WL
519395, at *1 (Apr. 8, 2002) (reporting that defendants Paloma and Bardasian had consented to the
entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Nichols, Litigation Release No. 17456, 2002 WL 519399, at *1
(Apr. 3, 2002) (reporting that defendants Hughes and Whittelsey had consented to the entry of lifetime
bar orders); SEC v. Barber, Litigation Release No. 17314, 2002 WL 54148, at *1 (jan. 15, 2002)
(reporting that defendant Barber had consented to a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Caserta, Litigation
Release No. 17115, 75 S.E.C. Docket 2221 (Sept. 5, 2001) (reponing that defendant Caserta had
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. ltex Corp., Litigation Release No. 16841, 73
S.E.C. Docket 4214 (Dec. 26, 2000) (reporting that defendant Baer had consented to the entry of a
lifetime bar order); SEC v. Itex Corp., Litigation Release No. 16708, 2000 Wll341720, at * 1 (Sept.
18, 2000) (reporting that defendant Neal had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v.
Mitchellette, Litigation Release No. 16553, 2000 WL 621125, at *1 (May 15, 2000) (reporting that
defendant Mitchellette had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Buchanan, Litigation
Release No. 16518, 72 S.E.C. Docket 748 (Apr. 18, 2000) (reporting the entry of a default judgment
resulting in a lifetime bar order against defendant Buchanan); SEC v. Strauss, Litigation Release No.
16360, 71 S.E.C. Docket 262 (Nov. 17, 1999) (reporting that defendant Strauss had consented to the
entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. United Fire Tech., Inc., Litigation Release No. 16271, 70 S.E.C.
Docket 1611 (Sept. 2, 1999) (reporting that defendant Kamerling had consented to the entry of a
lifetime bar order); SEC v. Drabinsky, Litigation Release No. 16022, 68 S.E.C. Docket 3278 (jan. 13,
1999) (reporting that defendant Eckstein had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v.
DiMauro, Litigation Release No. 15874, 67 S.E.C. Docket 3070 (Sept. 9, 1998) (reporting that defendant DiMauro had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Safronchik, Litigation Release
No. 15833, 67 S.E.C. Docket 2253 (Aug. 5, 1998) (reporting that defendant Safronchik had consented
to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Peltz, Litigation Release No. 15657, 1998 WL89096, at
*1 (Mar. 3, 1998) (reporting that defendant Peltz had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order);
SEC v. Kilgore, Litigation Release No. 15345, 64 S.E.C. Docket 1182 (Apr. 23, 1997) (reporting that
defendant Kilgore had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Nelsen, Litigation Release
No. 15343, 64 S.E.C. Docket 1180 (Apr. 22, 1997) (reporting that defendant Nelsen had consented
to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Pace, Litigation Release No. 15240, 63 S.E.C. Docket 2386
(Feb. 3, 1997) (reporting that defendant Pace had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC
v. Env't Cherns. Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15183, 63 S.E.C. Docket 1228 (Dec. 11, 1996)
(reporting that defendant Shenkir had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Kendall
Square Research Corp., Litigation Release No. 15155, 1996 SEC LEXIS 3143, at *1 (Nov. 12, 1996)
(reporting that defendant jones had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Axiom Sec.
Solutions, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15114, 62 S.E.C. Docket 3112 (Oct. 9, 1996) (reporting that
defendant Parshall had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Sarivoia, Litigation
Release No. 15110, 62 S.E.C. Docket 3109 (Oct. 4, 1996) (reporting that defendants Anthony Sarivola
and Donna Sarivola had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Bradstreet, Litigation
Release No. 15069, 62 S.E.C. Docket 2758 (Sept. 25, 1996) (reporting that three defendants had
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Trans-American Ostrich Traders, Inc., Litigation
Release No. 15037, 62 S.E.C. Docket 2404 (Sept. 11, 1996) (reporting that defendant Earp had
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Mclaughlin, Litigation Release No. 14951, 62
S.E.C. Docket 0486 (june 19, 1996) (reporting that defendant Mclaughlin had consented to the entry
of a lifetime bar order); SEC v. Sani-Tech Indus., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14943,62 S.E.C. Docket
0379 (june 11, 1996) (reporting that defendant Wasserman had consented to the entry of a lifetime
bar order); SEC v. Zuloff, Litigation Release No. 14558, 59 S.E.C. Docket 2430 (july 12, 1995)
(reporting that defendants Benjamin and Zuloff had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order);
SEC v. Towers Fin. Corp., Litigation Release No. 14317, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2941 (Nov. 2, 1994)
(reponing that defendant Hoffenberg had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order); SEC v.
Dunlop, Litigation Release No. 14214, 57 S.E.C. Docket 1448 (Aug. 31, 1994) (reponing that defen-
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"unreasonably high" standard of proof in suspension and bar casesY He also
claimed that "when it comes to 0 and D bars, the courts have simply lost their
way."4B
THE COURTS' INSISTENCE THAT THE COMMISSION
DEMONSTRATE A "REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF fUTURE
MISCONDUCT"

At the center of the Commission's concern about the federal courts' approach
to suspension or bar orders was the fact that, before entering such an order, the
courts were insisting that the government make an evidentiary showing that the
defendant posed a "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct."49 This requirement is not surprising, given that federal courts require a showing that misconduct
is reasonably likely to recur prior to entry of any type of injunction.50 Still, the
Commission seemed confounded by the problem of proving a reasonable likelihood of future misconduct, especially in cases involving first-time offenders. The
Enforcement Division staff objected to the idea expressed by the Second Circuit
in Patel 51 that first-time offenders should rarely be subject to a lifetime bar order. 5 2
They were especially worried that, in catastrophic cases such as Enron, Adelphia,
or WorldCom, lifetime bar orders might not be available.
The biggest problem, from the Commission's perspective, was the Second Circuit's insistence that concrete evidence of a threat of future misconduct is "always
an important element in deciding whether [to order) a lifetime ban."53 "Although
it is not essential for a lifetime ban that there be past violations," the court said,
dant Dunlop had consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order) ; SEC v. Delta Rental Sys., lnc., Litigation
Release No. 13073, 50 S.E.C. Docket 0144 (Oct. 29, 1991) (reponing that defendant Carvajal had
consented to the entry of a lifetime bar order). This is an incomplete list of the cases in which
defendants voluntarily accepted a lifetime bar order.
4 7. Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute
(Feb. 15, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch538.htm.
48. ld.
49. See, e.g., SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 527-30 (D.N.]. 1999) (entering a
lifetime bar order against one defendant where the "likelihood of future misconduct [was] high" but
declining to do so against another defendant where the "likelihood of future violations [was] not as
clear").
50. See, e.g., SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that if a defendant has
violated the federal securities laws, the SEC is entitled to a permanent injunction "if the court determines there is a reasonable likelihood that [the defendant[ will violate the laws again in the future");
SEC v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the applicable test is "whether the
SEC [could show] a reasonable and substantial likelihood that [the defendant}. if not enjoined, would
violate the securities laws in the future"), cert. denied sub nom. Holliday v. SEC, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984);
SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that to obtain an injunction, the SEC
must show that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant[s]. if not enjoined, will again
engage in the illegal conduct"); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, 1nc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir.
1972) (noting that the "critical question" in determining whether to issue an injunction is "whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated"). See generally United States v. WT.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
51. 61 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995). See infra notes 53-54, 132-33 and accompanying text.
52. See also SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 530 (D.N.]. 1999) (declining to
enter a lifetime bar order, but instead entering a five-year suspension order against defendant Constance Pignatiello, because, unlike her husband (who was barred), she was not "a repeat offender").
53. Patel , 61 F.3d at 141.
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"we think that it is essential, in the absence of such violations, that a district court
articulate the factual basis for a finding of the likelihood of recurrence." 54 This
problem was not new to the Commission. Similar concerns had surfaced in injunction cases where courts held that the Commission had failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct" test,
especially in cases involving a single violation.
In SEC v. Ingoldsby, 55 for example, the court found that the defendant's insider
trading was an "isolated event" 56 and his post-trial assurances that he would not
again violate Rule lOb-S were sufficiently credible to obviate the need for an
injunction. 5 7 In SEC v. Scott, 58 the court found that, even though one of the defendants , Raymond Dirks, had participated in a public offering with knowledge
of "grossly misleading" misstatements in the prospectus,59 and even though he
had a record of past misconduct before the Commission, evidence from counsel
with whom he had worked on other offerings suggested that he took great pains
to comply with the federal securities laws. 60 Accordingly, the court held that the
Commission had failed to establish a "reasonable likelihood that [his] past wrongdoing [would] recur."61
Thoughtful courts recognized, however, that past misconduct could be "highly
suggestive" of the likelihood of future misconduct 62 and that even a single violation or a cluster of related violations, if sufficiently egregious, could support the
entry of an obey-the-law injunction. 5 3 The legislative history of the Remedies Act
54. Id. at 142.
55. [1990 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ~ 95,351, at 96,692 (D. Mass. May 15 , 1990).
56. Id. at 96,693.
57. Id.
58. 565 F Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd sub. nom. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp.,
734 F2d ll8 (2d Cir. I984).
59. Id. at 1528.
60. Id. at 1537.
61. Td. at 1535-37; see also SEC.v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F2d 767, 769 (lOth Cir. 1993) (upholding
denial of an injunction where there was "no evidence that future violations are likely"); SEC v. Monarch
Fund, 608 F2d 938, 94 3 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing the trial court's entry of an injunction where the
SEC had failed to show "a realistic likelihood of recurrence" of misconduct); SEC v. Yun, 148 F Supp.
2d 1287, 1294 (M .D. Fla. 2001) (denying the Commission's request for an injunction because future
violations were unlikely-the defendants' actions were isolated , the conduct was not egregious, and
participants regretted their involvement), affd in part and vacated in part , 327 F3d 1263 (lith Cir.
2003); SEC vEnters. Solutions, Inc. , 142 F Supp. 2d 561 , 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to enter an
injunction against one of the defendants where the Commission failed to demonstrate that he was
likely to commit further violations); SEC v. Globus Group, Inc., ll7 F Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D.
Fla. 2000) (refusing to enter injunction where the Commission's action was based on "isolated, as
opposed to recurrent , violations of the securities laws"); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F Supp. 2d 508, 529
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (declining to enjoin one of the defendants because the Commission had failed to
demonstrate that it was reasonably likely that he would commit future violations), modified by 1998
U.S. Dist. LEX!$ 16020 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 8, 1998); SEC v. Big D Oil&: Gas Co., 434 F Supp. 589, 591
(D. Tex. 1977) (refusing to issue injunction).
62. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F2d 1149, ll68 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v. Mgmt.
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
63. See, e.g., Mgmt. Dynamics Inc., 515 F2d at 807-DB (upholding the entry of an injunction
against defendant Levy, even though his misconduct involved communications involving a single
corporate transaction); SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder[ Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)~ 92 ,004,
at 90,980 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 15 , 1985) (entering an injunction even though the defendant's unlawful tips
were all communicated in connection with a single tender offer).
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also suggested that a suspension or bar order might be warranted, even in the
absence of a history of repeated misconduct, if the conduct at issue could be
characterized as "egregious. "61 Thus, although most of the Remedies Act decisions
in which suspension or bar orders were entered involved recidivism, 6 ~ at least one
of the decisions involved a spectacular first-time offense. 66 It is difficult, in short,
to understand why the Enforcement Division was expressing so much anxiety
about its authority.
THE RISE AND USE OF CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS

Concurrent with the period during which the Commission was seeking suspension and bar orders in litigated proceedings in federal district courts-usually
successfully-the Commission was also perfecting its use of the cease-and-desist
proceeding, which, like the judicial suspension and bar authority, was authorized
by the Remedies Act 67 A cease-and-desist order may simply proscribe unlawful
conduct, or it may "require [the defendant] to comply, or to take steps to effect
compliance [with the law] upon such terms and conditions and within such time
as the Commission may specify. "68
Cease-and-desist proceedings offer the Commission many advantages over a
litigated civil enforcement action, including: (i) the proceedings typically move
much more quickly than a litigated proceeding; 69 (ii) the evidentiary requirements
are more relaxed/ 0 (iii) discovery is less generous/ 1 and (iv) unlike courts, which
64. SeeS. REP. No. 101-337, at 21 (1990) ("A permanent bar might be appropriate if the violation
were particularly egregious or the violator was a recidivist.").
65. See, e.g, SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F. 3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the defendant
was a recidivist); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 530 (D.N.j. 1999) (noting that
the case was not defendant joseph Pignatiello's first encounter with the securities laws: "He has been
restrained, censured , fined, and even imprisoned for prior securities violations and is currently facing
criminal charges . .. . In light of this, as well as the fact that he has failed to assure this court that he
will not engage in future violations ... the likelihood of future misconduct is high."); see also SEC v.
Drexel Burnham lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the SEC had sued
the defendants for antifraud violations twice before), afj'd sub nom. Posner v. SEC, 16 F.3d 520 (2d
Cir. 1994).
66. See, e.g., SEC v. Robinson, (2002 Transfer Binder! Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 91,948, at 90,479
(S.D.N.Y. july 16, 2002) (recommending a lifetime bar in light of the fact that defendant's violations
were not only "egregious," but also "flagrant, indeed one might say outrageous"). The Robinson court
also took into account the defendant's failure to admit wrongdoing in the underlying offense, plus his
violation of a preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case. ld.
67. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
68. See Securities Act§ 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a) (2000); Securities Exchange Act§ 21C(a), 15
U.S. C. § 78u-3(a) (2000); Investment Company Act § 9(f)(l), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-9(f)(l) (2000); Investment Advisers Act § 203(k)(l), 15 U.S. C. § 80b-3(k)(l) (2000).
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2003) (effective july 17, 2003) (amending rules to streamline procedures and reduce delay; among the new rules are deadlines for completion of administrative proceedings of either 120, 210, or 300 days).
70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.320-.326 (2003)
71. john F. X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, The Scope of Discovery Available in SEC Administrative
Proceedings , 224 N.Y. L. j. 3, 3 (Aug. 17, 2000) ("In contrast to actions commenced by the commission
in federal district court, where the parties enjoy equal access to the full spectrum of discovery devices
available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery in administrative proceedings is extremely limited.").
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are expected to tailor their injunctions so as not to interfere with lawful conduct, 72
the Commission is not required to finely tailor its cease-and-desist orders or to
seek the least restrictive means of confining the defendant's future activities. 73
Another advantage to the Commission of cease-and-desist proceedings over litigated proceedings is (v) the strong degree of deference given by reviewing courts
to Commission-authorized cease-and-desist orders. 74 It is not surprising, then,
that in the first decade after enactment of the Remedies Act, permanent ceaseand-desist orders became "one of the SEC's most used remedies." 75
THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CEASE-AND-DESIST
PROCEEDINGS

Cease-and-desist proceedings under section 21 C were created as an '"alternative
remedy' to an injunction [and were designed to be used] against persons who
commit isolated infractions." 76 The premise behind the cease-and-desist proceeding was that not all securities law violations warranted the imposition of an injunction and that sometimes an injunction was "arguably too harsh" 77 for the
misconduct alleged. Congress also believed that some mechanism should be
found by which the Commission could resolve simple cases "without protracted
negotiation or litigation."78 The defendants for whom the cease-and-desist proceeding would be appropriate were those who "present[ed] a lesser threat to
investors [than those whose cases would more appropriately be heard by a U.S.
district court]. "79 It was understood that the collateral consequences of a ceaseand-desist order would be less burdensome than a comparable court-ordered
obey-the-law injunction. 80
THE EVOLUTION OF THE "SOME RISK" STANDARD IN CEASEAND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS

As noted above, it has long been established that, for entry of an injunction,
any injunction, in a federal district court proceeding, the Commission must
72. See, e.g., Gemveto jewelry Co. v. jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
("[I[njunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit the [defendant's] specific legal violations.");
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1251 (2d Cir. 1984)
("Injunctive relief should be narrowly tailored to fit the specific legal violations adjudged.").
73. KPMG v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("If the Commission is to attain the
objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the
transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal.").
74. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Tash Force on SEC Settlements,
47 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1123-24 (1992) ("Traditionally, courts have interpreted the Commission's discretion in cases litigated before SEC ALjs to be quite broad. Provided the Commission articulates its
rationale for a given sanction, and the court confirms the Commission's findings that violations have
occurred, courts rarely disturb the sanction imposed as too severe.").
75. Andrew M. Smith, SEC Cease-and-Desist Orders, 51 ADMIN L. REv. 1197, 1198 (1999).
76. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 2001 SEC LEXIS 98, at *108
(Jan. 19, 2001) (citing 5. REP. No. 101-337, at 18 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 24 (1990)).
77. Smith, supra note 75, at 1202 (quoting the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, or the "Treadway Commission" report).
78. Id. at 1203 (quoting Chairman Richard C. Breeden, then-chairman of the Commission).
79. Id.
80. ld. at 1227-28.
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demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct."81 In recent years, the
Commission has taken the position that a lesser showing will suffice for entry of
a cease-and-desist order.
As late as 2000, most administrative law judges (Aljs) hearing SEC cease-anddesist cases assumed that, in order to support a cease-and-desist order, the Commission would have to satisfy the "reasonable likelihood" standard. 82 Some commentators, however, drawing on the experiences of other federal agencies,
suggested that a lesser standard might suffice. 83 Soon, the Commission began
advocating, and some of the Commission's administrative law judges began considering, alternatives to the "reasonable likelihood" standard. 84
Sooner or later, the Commission would have to resolve the issue on the record, 85
and the opportunity arose in 2001, when the Commission, for the first time,
embraced and articulated its preferred "some risk" standard for the entry of a
cease-and-desist order. The case involved an action against KPMG Peat Marwick
for failure to observe auditor independence requirements.5 6 In reversing the Alj's
refusal to issue a cease-and-desist order, the Commission ruled that the "reasonable likelihood of future misconduct" standard applicable in litigated proceedings
to support an injunction was not required in a cease-and-desist proceeding. After
reviewing the standards imposed on other federal agencies with cease-and-desist
authority, it concluded that "while Congress intended that cease-and-desist orders
be forward-looking, like injunctions, it intended that the showing of risk of future
violations be significantly less than that required for an injunction." 87
The Commission went on to articulate the applicable standard as the "some
risk" standard:
Though "some" risk is necessary, it need not be very great to warrant issuing
a cease-and-desist order. Absent evidence to the contrary, a finding of violation raises a sufficient risk of future violation. To put it another way, evidence showing that a respondent violated the law once probably also shows
a risk of repetition that merits our ordering him to cease and desist. Our
conclusion is suggested, though not compelled, by the statutory language.
81. See supra the section entitled "The Courts' Insistence that the Commission Demonstrate a
Reasonable Likelihood of Future Misconduct."
82 . See In re Flanagan, 2000 WL 98210, at *36 (Jan. 31 , 2000) ("Assuming, without deciding,
that the Division must show a reasonable likelihood of future violations, that showing has been made
here as to all three Respondents.").
83. See Smith, supra note 75, at 1226-27.
84. See Flanagan , 2000 WL 98210, at *36 (noting the "dispute" among the Commission's ALJs "as
to whether the Commission may only impose a cease and desist order where the respondent is
reasonably likely to commit similar securities violations in the future, or whether no additional showing beyond the underlying violation itself is necessary"); see also Smith, supra note 75, at 1198 (noting
that "[t]he agency. however, has yet to clarify the circumstances under which it will impose a ceaseand-desist order").
85. See In re Feeley & Willcox Asset Mgmt. Corp., 2000 WL 628245, at *22 (May 16, 2000) ("The
Commission has not [yet] resolved the issue of whether a cease and desist order requires a finding
that there be a likelihood of a future violation.").
86. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 2001 SEC LEXIS 98, at *2
(Jan. 19 , 2001).
87.ld. at*114.
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The statute specifies that we may impose a cease-and-desist order on a person
who "has violated" the securities laws. This contrasts with our authority to
seek injunctive relief in those instances when a person "is engaged or about
to engage" in violative conduct. 88

When challenged on this position, the Commission quickly backtracked and
conceded that the entry of a cease-and-desist order should not be an "automatic"
consequence of committing a single securities law violation. 89 Instead, it promised
to "continue to consider our traditional factors in determining whether a ceaseand-desist order is an appropriate sanction based on the entire record." 90 It described its intended process as follows:
Many of [the traditional] factors are akin to those used by courts in determining whether injunctions are appropriate, including the seriousness of the
violation, the isolated or recurrent nature of the violation, the respondent's
state of mind[,) the sincerity of the respondent's assurances against future
violations, the respondent's recognition of the wrongful nature of his or her
conduct, and the respondent's opportunity to commit future violations. In
addition, we consider whether the violation is recent, the degree of harm to
investors or the marketplace resulting from the violation, and the remedial
function to be served by the cease-and-desist order in the context of any
other sanctions being sought in the same proceedings. This inquiry is a
flexible one and no one factor is dispositive. This inquiry is undertaken not to
determine whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" of future violations but to
guide our discretion. 91
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, by a divided court, affirmed
the Commission's cease-and-desist order in the KPMG case. 92 The majority opinion upheld the Commission's use of a negligence, rather than a scienter, standard
in a section 2l C proceeding 93 It also embraced ·the Commission's adoption of a
"some-risk-of-future-misconduct" standard. 94 On the issue of whether a single
violation could suffice to support a cease-and-desist order under the "some risk"
standard, however, the majority blinked. Recognizing the issue as "problematic,"95
the court carefully reviewed the Commission's approach to the "some risk" issue.
Even though, the court noted, the Commission in its original KPMG opinion had
stated that a single violation sufficed to show the necessary likelihood of recurrence to support a cease-and-desist order, on reconsideration, the Commission
had cited multiple violations by KPMG. 96 The court went on to note:
88. Id. at *102-*03.
89. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44050, 2001 WL 223378, at *7
(Mar. 8, 2001) (denying rehearing).
90. Id.
91. In re KPMG Peat Marwick, 2001 SEC LEX!S 98, at *116 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
92. KPMG v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 120.
94. Id. at 124-26.
95. Id. at 124.
96. Id. at 125.
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The Commission's statement on reconsideration suggests that it may no
longer consider, as it initially made clear, that any one of its findings of a
violation, standing alone , would suffice under its standard to enter a ceaseand-desist order. At oral argument counsel for the Commission argued that
the language in the Reconsideration Order is insufficiently precise to suggest
that the Commission had changed its mind. In truth, the Reconsideration
Order leaves this unclear. Nevertheless, in light of the Commission's having
found several serious violations-all but one of which we affirm-we conclude that a remand is unnecessary. 97
In other words , on the issue of whether a "some-risk-of-future-misconduct"
standard or some higher standard should be required for entry of a cease-anddesist order, the majority deferred to the Commission. On the issue of whether a
single violation could satisfy the "some risk" standard, the majority equivocated:
"[W]e conclude that a remand to allow the Commission to clarify whether simply
one or a combination of two or more of the violations it found suffice to meet its
standard for finding a risk of future violation to enter a cease-and-desist order is
unwarranted in light of the Commission's [multiple] findings of violations .... "98
What this all means is (i) the Commission defined for itself the standard required to support a cease-and-desist order as merely "some risk" of future misconduct; (ii) the court of appeals acquiesced in this standard, at least under the
facts in the KPMG case; (iii) the court failed to address the question whether a
single violation, without more, could ever satisfy the Commission's "some risk"
standard; (iv) after Sarbanes-Oxley, the Commission will inevitably seek to apply
its "some risk" standard to requests for suspension or bar orders in cease-anddesist proceedings, even though suspension and bar orders are qualitatively different than other forms of cease-and-desist orders; 99 and (v) the Commission will
probably argue that even a single, non-spectacular violation of the securities laws
may be sufficient to support a suspension or bar order.
THE ORIGINS AND UNFOLDING OF THE 5ARBANES-0XLEY
SUSPENSION AND BAR PROVISIONS

The Enron scandal began to unfold on October 16, 2001, the date on which
Enron filed its quarterly financial figures and revealed that it was eliminating over
one billion dollars in shareholders' equity. 100 From that day forward , and throughout early 2002 , the SEC was constantly exhorted to be more aggressive, to act
more swiftly, and to take urgent action against corporate wrongdoers. In his March
7, 2002 public statement on corporate reform initiatives, President George W
Bush emphasized the need for "sound regulation and remedies where needed,
97.
98.
99.
Issue. "
100.

ld. (citation omitted).
ld. at 126.
See infra the section entitled "Lack of Guidance on the 'Likelihood of Future Misconduct'
John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big Loss-Part of
WALL Sr.].. Oct. 17 , 2001 , at Cl.
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without inviting a rush of new lawsuits that exploit new problems instead of
solving them." 101 Among other elements of his ten-point reform plan, Bush indicated his commitment to enhanced suspension and bar powers for the Commission: "CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose their
right to serve in any corporate leadership positions. This proposal, which would
require legislation, would authorize the SEC to ban individuals from serving
as officers or directors of publicly-held corporations if they engage in serious
misconduct. "102
SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt also stressed the need for stronger enforcement
tools at the Commission. 103 Stephen Cutler, the Commission's Director of Enforcement, went on the speaker's circuit, arguing that so long as suspension and
bar authority rested exclusively with the courts, individuals "engaged in egregious--even criminal-misconduct" would be free to resume or secure positions
as corporate officers and directors. 104 "The role of officers and directors is far too
important to allow those with a questionable commitment to the interests of
shareholders to serve," Cutler argued. 105
In response to these cries for legislative reform, on April 24, 2002, the House
of Representatives passed the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002. 106 One of the issues that was hotly debated
on this bill was whether the judicial standard for suspension or bar orders should
be changed from "substantial unfitness" to simple "unfitness." The Democrats
favored a change in the standard, while the Republicans favored the status quo.
After considerable wrangling, the House Financial Services Committee decided
that the "substantial unfitness" standard should not be amended but should be
left intact 107 and the House ultimately adopted that position by a vote of 334 to
90. 108 The House did pass a provision, however, extending authority to the SEC
to enter suspension and bar orders in a cease-and-desist proceeding, governed by
the same "substantial unfitness" standard as then applicable in the courts. 109
101. Press Release, President Outlines Plan to Improve Corporate Responsibility (March 7, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2002/03/20020307-3.html.
102. Specifics on the President's 10-Point Plan, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/03/20020307-3.html (last visited jan. 13, 2004).
103. See Harvey l. Pitt, Public Statement by SEC Chairman: Remarks at the SEC Speaks Conference
(February 22, 2002) (outlining the need for many improvements in the enforcement system, including
a statement of the Commission's intention to seek the power to impose officer and director bars in
cease-and-desist proceedings), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch540.htm.
104. jackie Spinner, Errant Directors May Face SEC Ban; Agency to Request New Authority, WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at El.
105. Cutler, supra note 47.
106. See 148 CONG. REc. H1544 (2002) (discussion of H.R. 3763).
107. jackie Spinner, Congress to Consider Expanding SEC Power to Ban Errant Executives, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 16, 2002, at E4; see also H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 42-43 (2002), available at http://
financialservices. house.gov/media!pdf/hr 107414. pdf.
108. juliet Eilperin &jackie Spinner, House Passes Accounting Reform Package; Bill May Face Senate
Test, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2002, at Al.
109. Id. The Republicans were deeply committed to this position. Until well into july 2002, the
White House continued to advocate SEC suspension and bar power authority only where the defendants had engaged in "serious misconduct." Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush and Democrats Still Deeply Split
on What Needs to Be Done, N.Y. TIMES, july 10, 2002, at C5.

HeinOnline -- 59 Bus. Law. 406 2003-2004

SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley

407

Then, as corporate reform moved from the House to the Senate, two important
things happened. First, the Democrats took control of the debate, and second,
the stock market began a sharp downward drop. From June 1 to July 15, 2002,
for example, the S&:P 500 index, stressed by the disclosure of accounting scandals
at WorldCom, Xerox, and Quest Communications, dropped from 1,040 to 918.
On July 23, the S&P index closed at 798.
These developments led to mounting pressure to strengthen the SEC's hand
on a number of issues. The upshot of the process was the passage on July 25,
2002 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by a vote of 423 to 3 in the House 110 and 99 to
0 in the Senate. 111 Between April24, 2002, when the House had passed its tepid
version of corporate governance reforms and the end of July 2002, the Republicans had capitulated on almost every issue. 112
The provisions governing suspension and bar orders, for example, were just as
the Democrats had prescribed from the beginning. First, section 305 of SarbanesOxley provides that the standard for the federal courts to use in deciding whether
to enter a suspension or bar order is now "unfitness" rather than "substantial
unfitness." 113 Second, section 1105 provides:
In any cease-and-desist proceeding . .. , the Commission may issue an order
to prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such
period of time as it shall determine, any person who has violated section
10(b) or the rules or regulations thereunder, from acting as an officer or
director of any [public company], if the conduct of that person demonstrates
unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer. 114
GAPS IN THE 5ARBANES-0XLEY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 115 provides little guidance on
the meaning of the new suspension and bar provisions, and especially on the
meaning of the new term "unfitness." 116 There is no reference, for example, to

llO. 148 CONG. REc. H5462, H5480 (2002).
lll. 148 CONG. REC. S7350, S7365 (2002).
112. See Jules Witcover, Senators Bail Out on Bush, SALT. SuN, July 17, 2002, at 15A (describing
the "GOP cave-in").
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305, 116 Stat. 778, 779 (2002).
114. /d.§ ll05, ll6 Stat. at809.
115. The legislative hisJOry of Sarbanes-Oxley consists of REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL
SERVICES TO ACCOMPANY, H.R. 3763, THE CORPORATE AND AUDITING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY,
AND TRANSPARENCY AcT OF 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-414 (2002); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS TO ACCOMPANY S. 2673, THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
REFORM AND INVESTOR PROTECTION Acr OF 2002, S. REP. No. 107-205 (2002); and CONFERENCE
REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3763, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-610 (2002).
116. The House Report refers only to the "substantial unfitness" standard that was included in the
House Bill but later revised in conference. H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at17, 42-43. The Senate Report
says only this: "The sanction of barring securities law violators from serving as officers or directors of
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cases in which executives have been removed from office for cause. 117 There is no
criticism of existing case law or of specific cases decided under the former "substantial unfitness" standard. 118
Ironically, it is not even clear from the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley that
the change in language from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness" was intended
to reduce the quantum of proof required of the government. Thomas Newkirk,
Associate Director of Enforcement at the SEC, has acknowledged that "a creative
defense lawyer might argue that it should be more difficult to determine that
someone is 'unfit' than it is to determine that the person is 'substantially unfit."' 119
In fact, it would not take much creativity to make this argument. Certainly, it is
easier for a litigant to demonstrate substantial compliance with a statute than to
demonstrate strict compliance with it. 120 Similarly, it is easier for a litigant to show
substantial performance of a contract than complete performance.121
Consequently, it should now be more difficult for the Commission to demonstrate "unfitness" than it was to demonstrate "substantial unfitness." I am not
making that argument, however; it is clear from context, if not from Congress,
that the "unfitness" standard was intended to reduce the Commission's burden,
not increase it.
That being said, there are a number of other problems and omissions in the
suspension and bar provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We will discuss these
problems below. First, though, let us consider the obvious advantages of the new
suspension and bar provisions.

public companies is strengthened by modifying the standard that governs judicial imposition of officer
and director bars." S. REP. No. 107-205, at 53. The Conference Report is silent with respect to both
sections 305 and 1105.
117. These types of cases, and cases in which non-disclosure of certain forms of misconduct have
been found to be a material omission in a proxy statement, might provide some useful illustrations
of the sorts of behavior that might render a person "unfit" to serve as a public company officer or
director. See Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, supra note 11, at
1495-99.
118. Often when Congress tries to "clean up" a statute or improve it in some way, the legislative
history makes clear just what about the prior statutory language was unsatisfactory, or what specific
judicial decisions Congress is attempting to overcome. See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I , at 23-32 ,
45-48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549 , 561-70, 583-86 (discussing Congressional intent
to overturn several Supreme Court decisions including Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); S. REP. No. 100-64, at 2 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3-4 (noting that the intent of the legislation was to "overturn the
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, and to restore the effectiveness and vitality of the four major civil rights statutes"). See generally, William N. Eskridge, jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.]. 331 (1991) (summarizing
Congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions from 1967-1990).
119. Audit Committees Want judicious Enforcement, CORP. COUNSEL WEEKLY (BNA), Aug. 20, 2002,
at 250-51.
120. See, e.g., Metropolitan Ufe Ins. Co. v. johnson, 97 E3d 558, 568 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
doctrine of substantial compliance by its very nature contemplates something less than actual
compliance.").
121. See , e.g., Patel v. Ambassador Drycleaning & Laundry Co., 86 S.W3d 304, 307 (Tex. App.
2002) (distinguishing between complete performance and substantial performance of a contract, with
the latter characterized by a breach of non-material terms).
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THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NEW REGIME
THE APPEAL OF THE SUSPENSION AND BAR PROVISIONS

The Commission sees several advantages to the Sarbanes-Oxley formula over
the Remedies Act formula for suspension and bar orders. Certainly, the new formula is advantageous both because it eliminates the need to go to court in many
cases, and, even in those cases that the Commission decides to take to court, it
imposes a lower standard of proof-"unfitness" rather than "substantial unfitness"-than was previously required under the Remedies Act.
There is also the issue of parity. Banking regulators have long enjoyed unilateral
suspension and bar authority with respect to banking officials. 122 The Commission
itself has exercised suspension and bar powers over brokers, investment advisers,
and investment company executives without having to go to court. 123 Significantly,
when administratively barring a regulated professional, the Commission has not
been required to demonstrate that a lifetime bar order is the least restrictive means
of protecting the public. 124 Lifetime bars are, thus, commonly ordered against
regulated professionals. 125 Suspension and bar powers over unregulated individuals, and the freedom to decide when a lifetime bar order is appropriate, can be
seen in this context as just another version of a proven and effective law enforcement tool.
Most importantly, the addition of suspension and bar powers to the Commission's arsenal sends a strong symbolic message . At the time he signed SarbanesOxley, President Bush declared that he intended to "do everything in [his] power
to end the days of cooking the books, shading the truth, and breaking our laws."126
Empowering the SEC to cut off a defendant's primary means of livelihood offers

122. See 12 U.S. C. § 1818(e)(l) (2000) (permitting debarment of a banking official where she has
"engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound [banking] practice" from which "the insured depository institution's depositors have been or could be prejudiced" and which "demonstrates willful
or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or soundness [of the banking system]"); see also
id. § 2264(b) (permitting debarment of any director or officer of an institution in the Farm Credit
System who "has evidenced either his personal dishonesty or a willful or continuing disregard for [the]
safety and soundness ]of the system]").
123. See 15 U.S. C.§ 78o(b)(4)(D) (2000) (brokers); id. § 80b-3(e) (investment advisers); id. § 80a9(b) (investment company executives).
124. Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000).
125. See, e.g., McNabb v. SEC, 298 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding Commission's
decision affirming a lifetime bar order imposed by NASD); Otto v. SEC, 253 F. 3d 960 (7th Cir. 2001)
(same), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1021 (2001); In re Edwards, Exchange Act Release No. 47682 (Apr. 15,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation!admin134-47682.htm (barring defendants Stock and
Lynds from any association with a broker or dealer); In re Abresch, Exchange Act Release No. 47655,
2003 SEC LEX!S 852, at *3 (Apr. 10, 2003) (barring defendant from any association with a broker
or dealer); In re Villar, Exchange Act Release No. 47625 (April 3, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation!admin/34-47625.htm (same); In re Ingardia, Exchange Act Release No. 47619,2003
SEC LEXIS 775, at *5 (Apr. 2, 2003) (same); In re j.W Barclay & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
47611, 2003 SEC LEXIS 762, at *5 (Apr. 1, 2003) (same); In re Efstathiou, Exchange Act Release
No. 47601, 2003 SEC LEXIS 757, at *3 (Mar. 31, 2003) (same); In re Bentley, Exchange Act Release No. 47589, 2003 SEC LEXIS 754, at *3 (Mar. 28, 2003) (same); In re Sanders, Exchange Act
Release No. 47579, 2003 SEC LEXIS 712, at *4 (Mar. 27, 2003) (same). This is an incomplete list.
126. Kenneth T. Walsh eta!., Bush & the Bear, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., july 22, 2002, at 20.
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an unquestionably powerful tool with which to secure cooperation, elicit critical
testimony, draw attention to high-profile wrongdoers, and impose crippling sanctions on defendants who refuse to cooperate with the government. Seen in the
context of widespread corporate abuses, the Congressional decision to expand
the Commission's powers in this area is a reasonable response to a pattern of
misconduct designed to achieve Congressional objectives in a cost-effective,
streamlined way.
PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUTE

Lack of Clarity About What Constitutes "Unfitness"
When the Remedies Act was passed in 1990, Congress provided little useful
guidance on the meaning of the term "substantial unfitness." This encouraged
federal judges to create their own meaning, a process with which the Commission
later took exception. 127 Now, Congress has passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
once again it has provided no guidance on the meaning of the new term "unfitness." Once again, the courts will devise their own approach to this issue, perhaps
deviating little from their approach to the earlier "substantial unfitness" standard.
One hopes the courts will focus on the core of the issue: whether a defendant is,
in fact, unfit to serve as an officer or director of a public company. This inquiry
should include consideration of (i) whether the defendant has an understanding
of the fiduciary role of an officer or director; (ii) whether there is reason to believe
that she is unable to perform that role professionally and responsibly in a setting
other than the setting in which her prior misconduct occurred; (iii) whether she
has expressed contrition for past misconduct and whether that expression is credible; and (iv) whether carefully-drawn limitations, such as a prohibition against
participating in the preparation of financial documents or communicating with
analysts or the public, might serve to ensure that, if the defendant is hired as an
officer or director, future misconduct will not recur. The primary question at the
end of the day will be whether the defendant's conduct was so far outside the
norms of professional conduct-because of its clandestine nature, the magnitude
of its harm, or the contempt it showed for the interests of investors-that the
defendant should be regarded as incapable of rehabilitation.
Regardless of which approach the courts ultimately embrace, the public would
have benefited greatly had Congress been more specific in its articulation of the
problem or problems it was trying to remedy. 128 At a minimum, Congress should
have specified the sorts of issues to be taken into consideration before entering a

127. See Cutler, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
128. As an example of the kind of clarity that would have been useful, see 15 U.S.C § 80ac9(b)
(2000), governing the debarment of investment company executives. Under this provision, an executive may be debarred only where:
(l) [he or she] has willfully made or caused to be made in any registration statement, application
or report filed with the Commission under this subchapter any statement which was at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
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suspension or bar order, either in the text or in the legislative history For example,
is a tippee who trades on non-public information about a company with which
she is not affiliated inevitably going to be characterized as "unfit"? 129 Should every
accountant or investment banker caught up in a fraudulent investment scheme
be treated as "unfit"? Which aspects of a securities law violation should matter to
the decision maker? The degree of scienter? The nature of the offense? The
character of the victims? The amount of harm done? In other contexts, Congress
has attempted to answer these questions. 130 Now, only case law will yield the
answers. 131

respect to any material fact, or has omitted to state in any such registration statement, application, or report any material fact which was required to be stated therein;
(2) [he or she! has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933 ... or of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or of subchapter II of this chapter, or of this subchapter,
or of the Commodity Exchange Act ... or of any rule or regulation under any of such statutes;
(3) !he or she] has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the
violation by any other person of the Securities Act of 1933 ... or of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ... or of subchapter II of this chapter, or of this subchapter, or of the Commodity
Exchange Act ... or of any rule or regulation under any of such statutes;
(4) !he or she] has been found by a foreign financial regulatory authority to have (A) made or caused to be made in any application for registration or report required to be
filed with a foreign securities authority, or in any proceeding before a foreign securities
authority with respect to registration, any statement that was at the time and in light of
the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or has omitted to state in any application or report to a foreign securities
authority any material fact that is required to be stated therein;
(B) violated any foreign statute or regulation regarding transactions in securities or contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery traded on or subject to the rules of a contract
market or any board of trade;
(C) aided , abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation by any other
person of any foreign statute or regulation regarding transactions in securities or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery traded on or subject to the rules of a
contract market or any board of trade;
(5) !he or she] within 10 years has been convicted by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction
of a crime , however denominated by the laws of the relevant foreign government, that is
substantially equivalent to an offense set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
section; or
(6) [he or she] by reason of any misconduct, is temporarily or permanently enjoined by any
foreign court of competent jurisdiction from acting in any of the capacities, set forth in
paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section, or a substantially equivalent foreign capacity,
or from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with any such
activity or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
129. For a case suggesting the answer to this question should be "no," see SEC v. Sargent, 329 F3d
34, 42 (lst Cir. 2003) (affirming the denial of an injunction and civil penalties for a tippee, notwithstanding the SEC's argument that such remedies were appropriate).
130. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(f) (2000) (requiring a decision on whether to bar a health care
provider from participating in Medicare programs to "take into account- (1) the nature of any claims
involved and the circumstances under which they were presented; (2) the degree of culpability, history
of prior offenses or improper conduct of the provider involved; and (3) such other matters as justice
may require").
131. Former SEC Commissioner Joe Grundfest recently suggested that leaving these kinds of issues
to the courts to resolve serves political ends. See joseph A. Grundfest, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation , 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628
(2002).
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Lack of Focus on Proportionality
As it did in the Remedies Act, Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has once
again failed to distinguish between the types of behavior that might give rise to a
finite-term suspension of eligibility from serving as an officer or director of a
public company and the types of behavior that should give rise to a lifetime bar
order. The statutory standard, "unfitness," is the same for each. Although unlike
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this format provides flexibility for courts in
determining the appropriate level of sanction, it does suggest a lack of clarity
about just what exactly Congress had in mind in this area. Certainly, it should
have been possible to delineate one standard of misconduct for a suspension order
and a higher standard of misconduct for a lifetime bar. 132 Failure to have done so
encourages the sort of muddy thinking (and prosecutorial overreaching) that the
court in SEC v. Patel 133 tried to minimize.

Lack of Guidance on the "Likelihood of Future
Misconduct" Issue
Although it is clear that the primary motivating factor behind the Commission's
efforts to secure its own suspension and bar powers was the desire to escape from
the judge-made requirement that it show a "reasonable likelihood" of future misconduct in order to secure a court-ordered suspension or bar, it is not at all clear
that Congress has delivered the intended result. Certainly, there is no indication
in the text of the statute or the legislative history that, in litigated proceedings,
any showing other than the traditional "reasonable likelihood" standard will be
required. Stated another way, it would have been easy enough for Congress in
either the text or the legislative history of the Act to set out in plain English the
conditions for finding "unfitness" in a litigated proceeding and to make clear
whether the "reasonable likelihood" standard or some lesser standard should now
apply. Neither the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself nor the legislative history of the Act,
however, says anything about what degree of likelihood of future misconduct will
be required for a federal district court to enter a suspension or bar order. Thus,
it is possible, even likely, that courts will continue to impose a "reasonable likelihood" standard in suspension and bar cases. In the absence of a clear directive
from Congress to the contrary, there is no reason why they should not do so. 134
132. For example, Congress might have said that simple "unfitness" could warrant entry of a finiteterm suspension order, while "significant unfitness" or "undeniable unfitness" or some similar formulation would warrant a lifetime bar order. Any choice of words suggesting a hierarchy of harm
would have been useful. Compare typical homicide statutes, which distinguish those types of killings
that are eligible for terms of imprisonment from other types of killings that are treated as capital
crimes.
133. See supra notes 35-37, 41-42, 51, 53-54 and accompanying text.
134. Support for this approach may be found in the legislative reenactment doctrine, which provides that, "when Congress enacts a comprehensive revision in an area of law while leaving untouched
well-established interpretations of the earlier legislation, Congress legislatively enacts the choices and
interpretations made." Douglas M. Branson, Prairie Populist? The Business and Securities Law Opinions
of justice john Paul Stevens, 27 RUTGERS l.j. 605, 620 (1996); see also ROBERT A. l<ATZMANN, COURTS
AND CONGRESS 48-49 (1997) ("When Congress does not give explicit direction about its legislative
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There is also no indication, either in the statutory text or in the legislative
history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as to whether Congress intended the "some
risk" standard or some higher standard to apply in cease-and-desist proceedings.
It is likely that the Commission will attempt to apply the "some risk" standard in
suspension and bar cases, however, at least until a court rules that it cannot do
so. As it happens , a court might make such a ruling in a suspension or bar case
if it takes into account the significant difference between a garden variety ceaseand-desist order and the much more burdensome suspension or bar order.
Most people would agree, for example, that they would rather submit to a
cease-and-desist order that requires them to abstain from future violations of the
law (while remaining employed) than submit to a suspension or bar order which
prohibits them from serving as an officer or director of a public company, even if
that service involves solely legal conduct. Given the difference in the impact of
these orders on individuals and their families, it would be entirely reasonable for
a reviewing court to conclude that the burden in terms of the future risk that
must be shown, should be higher, perhaps much higher, to support a suspension
or bar order in a cease-and-desist proceeding than that applicable to other types
of cease-and-desist orders.
The argument would go something like this: first, Congress has, in the past,
recognized the special impact of suspension or bar orders on professionals. In the
case of bankers, for example, Congress recognized:
[T)he power to suspend or remove an officer or director of a bank or savings
and loan association is an extraordinary power, which can do great harm to
the individual affected and to his institution and to the financial system as a
whole. It must be strictly limited and carefully guarded. 135
Thus, in passing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, which authorized
the FDIC to enter suspension and bar orders, the Senate took care to ensure that
the banking regulators did not descend to "arbitrary, capricious and overbearing
tactics" in dealing with banking officials. 136 The Senate committee involved with
the drafting of the statute insisted on a "narrow and careful delineation of the
circumstances" under which a banking official could be suspended or barred.137
"Congress purposefully limited the use of suspension and removal power[s] to
certain types of circumstances, well aware of the dangers of granting unfettered
discretion to the FDIC to wield such potentially devastating power." 138
Second, in authorizing the use of occupational restrictions as a condition of
probation or supervised release in criminal cases, Congress cautioned that such

meaning, it not only creates added burdens for the couns, it also increases the risk that the judiciary,
in a good faith effort to make sense of the problems before it, will interpret statutes in ways that the
legislature did not intend.").
135. S. REP . No. 1482 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N . 3532, 3539.
136. Anonymous v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866, 870-71 (D.D.C. 1985).
137. Id. at 871.
138. Id. at 872.
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conditions should be imposed only as "reasonably necessary" to protect the public.139 According to the report of the Senate judiciary Committee,
The Committee recognize[d] the hardship that can flow from preventing a
person from engaging in a specific occupation, business, or profession,
particularly for those activities requiring many years of education and
experience. 140
Courts, too, have noted the heavy burden placed on professionals when they are
stripped of their right to seek work commensurate with their skills, even temporarily. Courts have spoken of the "serious hardship" imposed when a defendant
is barred from seeking work nationwide. 141 Courts have also recognized that suspension and bar orders are a "radical measure" 142 of the sort that often requires
proof by clear-and-convincing evidence. 143
Given this background, and reading the suspension and bar provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in pari materia with comparable statutes, a court could certainly hold that the Commission, in the context of a cease-and-desist proceeding,
should refuse to enter a suspension or bar order unless the Commission can
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood, indeed a strong likelihood, that the defendant will continue to pose a risk to the public if permitted to serve as a corporate
officer or director. Whether a court will do so remains to be seen.

The Inherent Illegitimacy of a Lifetime Bar Order
Congress has established what apparently was intended to be a modest threshold, simple "unfitness," as the standard for the entry of a lifetime bar order. As
the Patel court recognized, however, lifetime bar orders are qualitatively different
from finite-term suspension orders, whether they are entered by a federal district
judge in a litigated proceeding, or by the Commission in a cease-and-desist proceeding. Lifetime bar orders are punitive in nature, 144 inherently overbroad in
139. 18 u.s. c. § 3583(d)(2) (2000).
140. S. REP. No 98-473, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3279.
141. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. at 872.
142. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975,992-93 (5th Cir. 1977) (declining to affirm the district
court's imposition of a lifetime bar even though it does affirm the forfeiture of the defendant's union
office), vacated, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979).
143. See, e.g., Crowe v. Smith, 261 F. 3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2001)(holding that in lawyer suspension
and disbarment cases, the state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence); Ferris v.
Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1987) (requiring that evidence of need to revoke a teacher's
license be clear and convincing). For a time, the federal courts required that the SEC prove its case
against regulated professionals by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d
676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1977). That
position was rejected by the Court in Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) (holding that
the substantive case against a regulated professional (e.g., a claim that the defendant violated Rule
lOb-S) need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence). At least one court has suggested
that the SEC should still be held to a clear-and-convincing standard of proof where the remedy sought
"would, in fact, deprive the defendants the ability to continue to pursue his livelihood." SEC v. Moran,
922 F. Supp. 867, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
144. See Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F. 3d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that a lifetime bar of a banker
has a "punitive purpose"); johnson v. SEC, 87 F. 3d 484, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that even a sixmonth suspension imposes a "punishment").
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both scope and duration, 1" 5 and difficult to justify in terms of what we actually
know about white collar recidivism. 146 They are, in the civil context, "the most
serious punishment available." 147
It is nonetheless obvious that the Commission is enamored with the lifetime
bar order and has recently increased its demands for this sanction. 148 It is, therefore, fair to stop and contemplate whether a lifetime bar order is appropriate
in a civil proceeding when a comparable order is not available in a criminal
proceeding!
Consider this: convicted criminals are often subjected to occupational restrictions during a period of probation or supervised release .149 The idea behind these
occupational restrictions is that keeping the offender away from the type of environment in which he committed his crime can simultaneously accommodate
both maximum autonomy for the unincarcerated defendant and maximum public
protection.
Significantly, however, occupational restrictions in criminal cases are extremely
limited:
145. See Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders
in Order to Protect Them, supra note 11, at 65-67.
146. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal justice,
114 HARV. L REv. 1429, 1450 (2001) ("A scientist's ability to predict future criminality using all
available data is poor; using just the proxy of prior criminal history, a scientist's prediction is even
less accurate ."); DAVID WEISBURD ET AL, WHITE-COLlAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS 135 (2001)
("It is difficult to predict future criminality on the basis of knowledge of the offenderl'ls past social
and criminal conduct and circumstances.").
147. McNabb v. SEC, 298 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fisher,].. dissenting) .
148. In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Commission sought court orders seeking to bar 126
defendants from serving as an officer or director of a public company, "more than triple the number
sought two years earlier." Andrew Countryman , Amid Budget Battle, SEC Chief Notes Soaring Activity,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2002 , at Bl.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Jost, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17109, at *2 (lOth Cir. July 31, 2001)
(upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from engaging in any sales-related employment, any
employment which required him to invest money for others, or any employment which required him
to render investment advice); United States v. Goodman, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27293, at *3 (lOth
Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from being self-employed, or
operating as an independent contractor, officer, partner, or manager in any business or business entity
without prior approval from his probation officer; also providing that he may not have access to or
control over third-party financial information, accounts or transactions or be employed by a telemarketing venture); United States v. Szenay, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13656, at *ll (6th Cir. june 15, 1999)
(upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from starting or owning his own business); United
States v. Morris, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4194, at *2 (lOth Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (upholding an order
prohibiting the defendant from engaging in any type of employment which involves the processing
of credit applications, or the solicitation of investors or lenders); United States v. Choate, 101 F.3d
562 , 566 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from self-employment during
his term of supervised release), reh'g denied, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1240 (8th Cir. jan. 24, 1997);
United States v. Berridge, 74 F.3d 113, 114 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding an order prohibiting the
defendant from obtaining employment in the banking industry); United States v. Manogg, 1995 U.S.
App. LEX\$ 10899, at *3 (6th Cir. May 11 , 1995) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant
from participating in or becoming a party to any real estate transaction or affiliated with any business
entity at an executive or administrative level); United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir. 1992)
(upholding an order prohibiting the defendant from working in the car sales business), reh'g denied ,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13939 (5th Cir. June 2, 1992); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 146 (5th
Cir. 1979) (upholding an order prohibiting the defendant-a former Member of Congress-from running
for office or engaging in political activity).
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[Such restrictions are permitted] "only if [the court] determines that: (l) a
reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation
.. . and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and (2) imposition
of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because
there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will
continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted." 150

Congress has further ordered that occupational restrictions on convicted criminals
should "involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary"
to promote criminal deterrence, protection of the public, and effective correctional
treatment.151 This means that occupational restrictions may only be imposed "for
the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public." 151
Furthermore, occupational restrictions must be "especially fine-tuned" so as not
to impinge on the defendant's lawful behavior.153
More importantly for purposes of thinking about lifetime bar orders in civil
cases, and especially in cease-and-desist proceedings, occupational restrictions in

criminal cases expire no later than the date upon which the maximum sentence for the
crime would have expired. In other words, if a sentence of incarceration could have
run for a maximum of five years, the defendant's occupational restriction expires
at the end of five years. There is no mechanism in criminal cases to impose any
kind of lifetime occupational bar order. Thus, a defendant can be ordered not to
engage in the used car business during the period of his supervised release, but
he cannot be ordered to close or sell his dealership; 154 a defendant can be ordered
not to practiCe pharmacy during his period of probation but he cannot be ordered
to surrender his pharmacy license. 155 It is entirely reasonable to prohibit a lawyer
from practicing law during his period of probation, so long as he is not ordered
to surrender his license or required to resign from the bar. 156 In each case, the
idea is that the offender, having served out his term of probation or supervised
release, should be free to enter the occupational marketplace without limitations
other than those the market itself imposes.
Even where Congress has imposed an automatic occupational disqualification
upon conviction of certain crimes (and note, Congress has not done so in the case
of securities law violations), it has often recognized that significant intrusions into
a defendant's ability to seek meaningful work should be time-limited. 157
150. United States v. Peterson, 248 E3d 79 , 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES§ 5Fl.5); see also United States v. Doe, 79 E3d 1309, 1319 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e 'carefully
scrutinize unusual and severe conditions, such as one requiring the defendant to give up a lawful
livelihood."') (quoting United States v. Cutler, 58 E3d 825, 838 (2d Cir. 1996)).
151. 18 u.s.c. § 3583(d) (2000).
152. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES§ 5Fl.5(b).
153. United States v. Scott, 270 E3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 2001).
154. United States v. Mills, 959 E2d 516, 519-20 (5th Cir. 1992).
155. United States v. Sterber, 846 E2d 842 , 843-44 (2d Cir 1988).
156. United States v. Cutler, 58 E3d 825 , 838 (2d Cir. 1995).
157. See 29 U.S. C. § 504(a)(5) (2000) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, bribery, extortion , embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, or violent crimes bars
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These inconsistencies, though probably not of constitutional proportions, do
make one wonder about the necessity for a lifetime bar order except in the most
extreme cases, or cases involving documented recidivism. 158 There is certainly
reason to wonder whether a lifetime bar order can possibly be appropriate in the
context of a cease-and-desist proceeding, which was designed to deal with those
inconsequential infractions unworthy of a litigated proceeding. 159 Yet, that apparently is what Congress has authorized. As of now, here is the playing field on
which the Commission will most likely be operating, with predictable results:
Securing a Suspension or Lifetime Bar Order Against a Securities Law Violator
. Criminal Prost:cution

Civil Enrorcement Action

Ccase·and·Dtsist Proceeding

What Must Be Proved'

Guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; a "willful" violation

Liability by a preponderance
of the evidence; unfitness
by clear and convincing
evidence

liability by a preponderance
orthe evidence . unfitness
by a preponderance of the
evidence

The Standard for Imposing a
Temporary Disability
("Suspension")

.. there is reason to believe
that , absem such restriction,
the defendant will continue to
engage in unlawful conduct
similar to that for which the
defendant was convicted;" the
disability must be narrowly
drawn

"a reasonable likelihood of
future misconduct"

"some risk" of
future misconduct

The Standard for Imposing a
Pe nnanent Bar

Not permitted

"a reasonable likelihood of
future misconduct"

"some risk" of future

misconduct

the offender from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board, business
manager, or representative of any labor organization for at least three but no more than thirteen years);
id. § 1111(a)(3) (2000) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, bribery, extonion, embezzlement,
grand larceny, burglary, arson , violation of narcotics laws, or violent crimes bars the offender from
serving as an officer, director, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, employee or representative in any
capacity of an employee benefit plan for at least three but no more than thirteen years); 33 U.S. C.§ 569f
(2000) (establishing that the conviction for intentionally affixing a label bearing "Made in America"
inscription to a product that is not made in the United States and is used in a civil works project
requires debarment for at least three but no more than five years) .
158. Another area for possible exploration is the inconsistency in the sanctions imposed on regulated professionals when compared to the sanctions imposed on non-regulated individuals. Often,
regulated professionals are sanctioned by the Commission for finite-and brief-periods, rather than
barred for life, even when their misconduct has been "egregious" or even criminal. See, e.g., In re Wu,
Exchange Act Release No. 45694, 2002 SEC LEXlS 843, at *26-*27 (Apr. 4, 2002) (barring the
defendant from association with a broker or dealer, but providing that he can reapply for association
after two years, even though the defendant's conduct was "reckless and egregious"); In reQuest Capital
Strategies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44935 , 2001 SEC LEXIS 2147, at *29 (Oct. 15, 2001)
(barring the defendant from association with a broker or dealer, but providing that he can reapply
after one year, even though the defendant's supervisory failures were "egregious," and reflected "abdication of supervisory responsibility"); In re Rosenthal, Exchange Act Release 40387 , 1998 SEC LEXIS
1850, at *10 (Sept. 1, 1998) (barring the defendant from association from a broker or dealer, but
providing that he can reapply after three years, even though the defendant's conduct - for which he
was convicted in a criminal prosecution- involved attempting to bribe a pension fund manager).
Commentators have also noted that many barred professionals effectively are able to continue
working in the financial services industry even after being suspended or barred, merely by switching
from one segment of the industry to another, for example, by working [or an investment adviser rather
than for a brokerage firm. See Heather Timmons &: Mike McNamee, Banned for Life (Sort of), Bus.
WK., Mar. 3, 2003, at 112.
159. See supra notes 6 7-99 and accompanying text.
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The Lack of a Meaningful Safety Valve
At least in theory, a permanent bar order "is not necessarily an irrevocable
sanction; upon application, the Commission, if it finds that the public interest no
longer requires the applicant's exclusion from the securities business, may permit
his return-usually subject to appropriate safeguards." 160 This rule, applicable in
cases of regulated professionals, should apply equally in cases of unregulated
individuals. Had Congress acted consistently with its prior practice, the SarbanesOxley Act would have contained some statutory guidelines for the lifting of lifetime bar orders. For example, Congress has directed that health care providers
debarred from participating in the Medicare program may apply for reinstatement
after the passage of three years, if they can provide "reasonable assurances that
the types of actions which formed the basis for the original debarment have not
recurred and will not recur." 161 Labor union officials debarred from holding a
union office following a criminal conviction may apply for reinstatement after the
passage of three years by showing that the reinstatement "would not be contrary
to the purposes of [the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure] Act." 162
Banking officials debarred from involvement with insured depository institutions
following a criminal conviction may apply for reinstatement at any time by showing that lifting the bar would be "in the interest of justice." 163
At a minimum, the Commission should now articulate procedures and standards for seeking relief from lifetime bar orders, as it has done in connection with
professionals barred from practicing before the Commission 164 and regulated professionals barred from associating with regulated firms. 165 Among other provisions, those procedures and standards should include an opportunity to seek relief
from a lifetime bar after no more than eight years, the opportunity to present
witnesses and build a complete record of the defendant's rehabilitation, and the
possibility of some form of peer review or peer supervision, both before and after
the lifting of the bar. 166
CONCLUSION

As many have noted, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a hasty piece of work. Haste
is especially evident in the provisions governing the power to suspend or bar
160. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F2d 589,598 (2d Cir. 1969).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(g)(4) (2000).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a)(5) (2000).
163. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)(2)(B) (2000).
164. SEC Rules of Practice, R. 102(e)(5), 17 C. FR. § 20l.l02(e)(5) (2003) (governing petitions for
reinstatement of accountants or lawyers).
165. SEC Rules of Practice, R. 193, 17 C. FR.§ 201.193 (2003) (governing applications by barred
individuals for consent to associate with brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, government
securities brokers, government securities dealers, investment advisers, investment companies or transfer agents).
166. The experiences of reinstated lawyers and doctors might provide guidance in the formulation
of standards that would govern the process of lifting the bar. See Kimberly A. Lacey, Second Chances:
The Procedure, Principles, and Problems With Reinstatement of Attorneys After Disbarment, 14 GEO. ].
lEGAL ETHICS 1117 (200 1).
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securities law violators. We know that "unfitness" is now the standard upon which
courts and the Commission may decide whether to enter a suspension or bar
order. We do not know with any certainty, however, (i) what "unfitness" means;
(ii) what distinguishes between unfitness sufficient to support a finite-term suspension order and the kind of unfitness necessary to support a lifetime bar order;
(iii) what standard-"reasonable likelihood of future misconduct" or some lesser
standard-will be required to support a suspension or bar order in the federal
district courts; (iv) what standard-"some risk" of future misconduct or some
higher standard-will be required to support a suspension or bar order in an SEC
cease-and-desist proceeding; (v) how and under what circumstances defendants
subject to a lifetime bar order may be eligible for a lifting of the bar; and (vi) what
the in terrorem impact of the suspension and bar provisions will be on corporate
executives.
Certainly, it is understood that "the new language will yield more aggressive
use of the D&O bar sanction by the SEC and harsher results for individuals." 167
It is also anticipated that the SEC's position in settlement discussions will be
strengthened. These advantages may be lost, however, if the Commission itself
does not use its new powers in a reasonable way, either through judicious practice
or, better yet, the enactment of reasonable rules and regulations which will provide
the clarifications that Congress, in its haste, omitted.

167. Alan Cohen & Michael Dunn, White Collar Crime-Maximum Security,
2002, at 29.
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